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1 Introduction
In the division problem an amount of a perfectly divisible good has to be allocated among
a set of agents with single-peaked preferences on the set of all positive amounts of the
good. An agent has a single-peaked preference if he considers that there is an amount of
the good (the peak) strictly preferred to all other amounts and in both sides of the peak
the preference is monotonic, decreasing at its right and increasing at its left. A prole is a
vector of single-peaked preferences, one for each agent. It would then be desirable that the
chosen vector of allotments of the good depended on the prole. But since preferences are
idiosyncratic they have to be elicited by a rule selecting, for each prole of single-peaked
preferences, a vector of allotments adding up to the total amount of the good. But in
general, the sum of the peaks will be either larger or smaller than the total amount to be
allocated. Then, a rule has to solve a positive or negative rationing problem, depending on
whether the sum of the peaks exceeds or falls short the amount of the good. Rules di¤er
from each other on how this rationing problem is resolved in terms of its induced properties
like the strategic incentives faced by agents, e¢ ciency, fairness, monotonicity, consistency,
etc.
The literature on the division problem describes many examples of allocation problems
that t well with this general description. For instance, a group of agents participate in an
activity that requires a xed amount of labor (measured in units of time). Agents have a
maximal number of units of time to contribute, and consider working as being undesirable.
Suppose that labor is homogeneous and the wage is xed. Then, strictly monotonic and
quasi-concave preferences on the set of bundles of money and leisure generate single-peaked
preferences on the set of potential allotments where the peak is the amount of working
time associated to the optimal bundle. Similarly, a group of agents join a partnership to
invest in a project (an indivisible bond with a face value, for example) that requires a
xed amount of money (neither more nor less). Their risk attitudes and wealth induce
single-peaked preferences on the amount to be invested. Finally, a group of rms with
di¤erent sizes have to jointly undertake a unique project of a xed size. Since they may be
involved in other projects their preferences are single-peaked on their respective allotments
of the project. In all these cases, it is required that a rule solve the rationing problem
arising from a vector of peaks that do not add up the needed amount. The uniform rule
has emerged as a satisfactory way of solving the division problem. It tries to allocate the
good as equally as possible keeping the bounds imposed by e¢ ciency. Sprumont (1991)
started a long list of axiomatic characterizations of the uniform rule by showing rst that
it is the unique e¢ cient, strategy-proof and anonymous rule, and second that anonymity
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in this characterization can be replaced by envy-freeness. Ching (1994) strengthens the
results of Sprumont (1991) by showing that the uniform rule is the only one satisfying
e¢ ciency, strategy-proofness and equal treatment of equals. Ching (1992), Dagan (1996),
Schummer and Thomson (1997), Sönmez (1994), and Thomson (1994a, 1994b, 1995, and
1997) contain alternative characterizations of the uniform rule in the division problem. In
the survey on strategy-proofness of Barberà (2010) the division problem and the uniform
rule play a prominent role.
However, almost all the literature on the division problem has implicitly neglected the
fact that in many applications (like those described above), agents allotments may be
constrained by objective and veriable minimal and maximal capacities which impose lower
and upper bounds on them. Those constraints may come from physical, legal or economic
restrictions. Most often, real-life applications of the division problem have the feature that
agentsallotments are constrained. For instance in problems where the good to be divided
is time, like in the internal distribution of labor in a division of a rm, or in a bureau, or in
a law rm, or like in the assignment of teaching duties among a given set of teachers of a
particular subject in a school or university department. In all those cases, constraints due to
physical or legal limitations (like labor contracts) impose unavoidable bounds to the agents
allotments. But constraints also show up in problems where agents have to contribute with
money to nance a project of a xed value, if they face budget constraints or if, due to
implicit participation costs, their contributions have to be larger than a given amount (and
hence, agentsallotments are bounded below as well). Big projects that can not be carried
out by a single rm may be split among a set of rms which are not able to undertake
alone the project precisely due to their capacity constraints and, in addition, each rm
participation (in order to be valuable to itself) may require receiving an allotment of the
project above a given amount. Therefore, in all these cases the division problem is restricted
further by feasibility constraints that are described by a family of closed intervals of non-
negative feasible allotments, one for each agent. It is then natural to assume that each agent
has a closed interval of feasible allotments and his idiosyncratic preferences are single-peaked
on this interval. Moreover, we will be interested in situations where agentsparticipation
is voluntary; namely, each agent has to consider all his strictly positive feasible allotments
as being strictly preferred to receive zero (the allotment associated to the prospect of non-
participating in the division problem). What is specic to our paper is that we assume
that each agents allotment has to either belong to a given feasible interval of allotments
or else be equal to zero. Hence, a division problem under constraints is composed by the
set of agents, the amount of the good to be allocated among them, the vectors of lower
and upper bounds of their feasible intervals, and their single-peaked preferences on their
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respective feasible intervals. We want to emphasize that our model contains all particular
instances of division problems where agentsallotments are only constrained by maximal
capacity restrictions because the lower bounds may be equal to zero, as in some of the
real-life applications that we have just described above.
Given a division problem under constraints, it may be the case that there does not exist
a vector of feasible allotments adding up to the total amount to be allocated. Hence a rule
has two components. First, the choice of an admissible and non-empty subset of agents
among whom it is possible to allocate the amount of the good keeping their feasibility
constrains; if there is no such subset, then the rule has to choose the zero allotment for
all agents. Second, and given this chosen admissible non-empty subset of agents (called
participants), the rule has to assign to each participant a feasible allotment in such a way
that their sum adds up to the total amount to be allocated.
Our contribution in this paper is to dene extensions of the uniform rule to this class
of division problems under constraints and to provide an axiomatic characterization of
them by using two classes of desirable properties. The rst class is related to the behavior
of the rule at a given division problem under constraints. First, e¢ ciency. A rule is
e¢ cient if it always selects Pareto optimal allocations. Second, equal treatment of equals. A
rule satises equal treatment of equals if identical participants receive the same allotment.
The second class is related to the restrictions that the properties impose on a rule when
comparing its proposal at di¤erent division problems under constraints. First, strategy-
proofness. A rule is strategy-proof if no agent can protably alter the rules choice by
misrepresenting his preferences. Second, bound monotonicity. Assume that the upper
bound of an agent decreases. Two situations are possible. Either the allotment of this
agent in the initial problem is not larger than the new upper bound or it is strictly larger
than the new upper bound. In the rst situation bound monotonicity says that both
problems must have the same allotment. In the second situation, bound monotonicity says
that the agent must receive his new upper bound whereas the rest of the agents can not
receive smaller allotments. Symmetric arguments can be applied when the lower bound
of an agent increases. Third, consistency. Assume that after applying the rule to a given
problem a subset of agents leave with their assigned allotments. Consider the new problem
with the remaining set of agents and the total amount of the good minus the sum of the
allotments received by the agents that already left. The rule is consistent if the allotments
it proposes to the remaining agents in the reduced problem coincides with their allotments
in the original problem. Fourth, independence of irrelevant coalitions. Assume the set
of admissible coalitions in one problem is contained in the set of admissible coalitions in
another problem and the coalition chosen by the rule in the larger problem is admissible
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for the smaller one, then this property says that the rule has to select the same coalition
of participants in the two problems.
The main ndings of the paper appear in two theorems. In Theorem 1 we show that
in the subclass of division problems under constraints with the property that the full set
of agents is admissible, the feasible uniform rule is the unique rule satisfying e¢ ciency,
strategy-proofness, equal treatment of equals, and bound monotonicity. This result is an
extension of the characterization of Ching (1994) for the uniform rule in the classical division
problem. The feasible uniform rule on this subclass of division problems under constraints
tries to allocate the good among all agents in the most egalitarian way respecting not only
the bounds imposed by e¢ ciency, but also those imposed by the feasibility constraints.
An extended uniform rule on the class of all division problems under constraints selects
rst, using a monotonic and responsive order on the family of all non-empty and nite
subsets of agents, an admissible coalition of participants (if any, otherwise it chooses the
zero allotment for all agents) and then it applies the feasible uniform rule to the reduced
division problem under constraints obtained by restricting the original problem to this
admissible subset of participants. We show in Theorem 2 that the class of all extended
uniform rules (each one associated to a monotonic and responsive order on the non-empty
and nite subsets of agents) coincides with the set of rules satisfying e¢ ciency, strategy-
proofness, equal treatment of equals, bound monotonicity, consistency and independence
of irrelevant coalitions.
Several papers are closely related to the present one. First, Bergantiños, Massó and
Neme (2012a) studies the division problem with maximal capacity constraints under the
assumption that the sum of all upper bounds is larger than the total amount of the good
that has to be distributed. Second, Kibris (2003) studies the division problem with maximal
capacity constraints assuming free-disposability of the good. Then a rule assigns to each
division problem with maximal capacity constraints a vector of allotments satisfying the
constraints and adding up less or equal than the total amount. Kibris (2003) characterizes
an extension of the uniform rule to his setting with free-disposability. Third, Bergantiños,
Massó and Neme (2012b) considers the division problem when agents participation is
voluntary. Each agent has an idiosyncratic interval of acceptable allotments (which, in
contrast with our setting here, is private information) where his preferences are single-
peaked. Then a rule proposes to each agent either to not participate at all or an acceptable
allotment. Bergantiños, Massó and Neme (2012b) shows that strategy-proofness is too
demanding in this setting. Then, they study a subclass of e¢ cient and consistent rules
and characterize extensions of the uniform rule that deal explicitly with agentsvoluntary
participation. Fourth, Kim, Bergantiños and Chun (2012) characterize two families of rules,
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related with the rules studied in Bergantiños, Massó and Neme (2012b) and this paper,
using the separability principle and other properties. Fifth, Manjunath (2012) proposes a
division problem where each agents preferences are characterized by a top and a minimum
allotment in such a way that the agent is indi¤erent between any two quantities that are
either below the minimum acceptable allotment or above the top allotment. Manjunath
(2012) rst shows that, under di¤erent fairness properties, strategy-proofness and e¢ ciency
are incompatible and second, he characterizes axiomatically di¤erent rules that solve the
rationing problem in his setting. Finally, the division problem with maximal capacity
constraints is also considered by Moulin (1999).1 He characterizes the class of all xed
path mechanisms as the set of rules satisfying e¢ ciency, strategy-proofness, consistency
and resource monotonicity. Ehlers (2002a) presents a shorter proof of the main result in
Moulin (1999) and Ehlers (2002b) extends it by showing that, for problems with strictly
more than two agents, the class of all xed path mechanisms coincides with the set of rules
satisfying weak one-sided resource monotonicity, strategy-proofness and consistency.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model. In Section 3
we dene several desirable properties that a rule may satisfy. In Section 4 we dene the
feasible uniform rule (for the subclass of division problems under constraints where the
grand coalition is admissible) and the extended uniform rule induced by a monotonic and
responsive order on the family of all nite and non-empty subsets of agents and state their
axiomatic characterizations. Section 5 contains some nal remarks stating other desirable
properties that all extended uniform rules also satisfy. The proofs are in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
Let t > 0 be an amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good. A nite set of
agents is considering the possibility of dividing t among a subset of them, to be determined
according to their preferences. We will consider situations where the amount of the good
t and the nite set of agents may vary. Let N be the set of positive integers and let N be
the family of all non-empty and nite subsets of N. The set of agents is then N 2 N with
cardinality n. In contrast with Sprumont (1991), we consider decision problems where the
amount of the good received by each agent i 2 N is constrained either to belong to a given
closed interval [li; ui]  [0;+1), determined by lower and upper exogenous constraints (li
and ui, respectively), or to be equal to zero. That is, an agent is either excluded from the
1In Moulin (1999) the maximal capacity constraints are justied on the basis of technical simplicity in
oder to dene the priority rationing methods by an ordinary path and to dene the duality operator that
cuts the main proof in half.
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division (and receives zero) or else his allotment has to be feasible. We are interested in
settings where the participation of the agents in the division problem is voluntary in the
sense that all strictly positive feasible allotments are strictly better than receiving zero.
Thus, agent is preferences i are dened on the set f0g [ [li; ui], with 0  li  ui  +1
and li < +1: The set [li; ui] is agent is interval of feasible allotments. We assume that i
is a complete, reexive, and transitive binary relation on f0g [ [li; ui]. Given i, let i be
the antisymmetric binary relation induced by i (i.e., for all xi; yi 2 f0g [ [li; ui], xi i yi
if and only if yi  xi does not hold) and let i be the indi¤erence relation induced by i
(i.e., for all xi; yi 2 f0g [ [li; ui], xi i yi if and only if xi i yi and yi i xi). We will
also assume that i is single-peaked on [li; ui] and we will denote by pi 2 [li; ui] agent is
peak. Formally, agent is preferences i is a complete preorder on the set f0g [ [li; ui] that
satises the following additional properties:
(P.1) there exists pi 2 [li; ui] such that pi i xi for all xi 2 [li; ui]nfpig;
(P.2) xi i yi for any pair of allotments xi; yi 2 [li; ui] such that either yi < xi  pi or
pi  xi < yi; and
(P.3) xi i 0 for all xi 2 [li; ui]nf0g.
Observe that agent is preferences are dened on f0g [ [li; ui] and are independent of t:
Moreover, we are admitting the possibilities that li = 0 and li = pi = ui. Conditions (P.1)
and (P.2) are the standard single-peaked restrictions on [li; ui] while condition (P.3) conveys
the minimal voluntary participation requirement that all strictly positive allotments in the
feasible interval are strictly preferred to the zero allotment. A preference i of agent i is
(partly) characterized by the triple (li; pi; ui). There are many preferences of agent i with
the same (li; pi; ui); however, they di¤er only on how two allotments on di¤erent sides of pi
are ordered while all of them coincide on the ordering on the allotments on each of the sides
of pi. This multiplicity will often be irrelevant. We will assume throughout the paper that
for any agent i, the bounds li and ui are xed and exogenously given while the preference
i over the interval [li; ui] is idiosyncratic and has to be elicited through a direct revelation
mechanism. As we have already discussed in the Introduction, we are interested in division
problems where allotments may be restricted by objective feasibility or capacity constraints
while every preference i satisfying (P.1), (P.2), and (P.3) is a legitimate one for agent i.2
2See Bergantiños, Massó, and Neme (2012b) for an analysis of e¢ cient and consistent rules in the
division problem when the interval [li; ui] is the set of idiosincratic acceptable allotments for agent i and
participation is voluntary.
6
Let N 2 N be a set of agents. A prole N= (i)i2N is an n tuple of preferences sat-
isfying properties (P.1), (P.2) and (P.3) above. Given a prole N and agent is preferences
0i we denote by (0i;Nnfig) the prole where i has been replaced by 0i and all other
agents have the same preferences. When no confusion arises we denote the prole N by
.
A division problem under constraints (a problem for short) is a 5 tuple P = (N; t; l; u;)
where N 2 N is the nite set of agents, t is the amount of the good to be divided, l = (li)i2N
is the vector of lower constraints, u = (ui)i2N is the vector of upper constraints, and  is
a prole. Although the vector of lower and upper constraints are part of the denition of
the prole ; for convenience we explicitly include them in the description of a problem.
Let P be the set of all problems.
Given a problem P = (N; t; l; u;) we denote by Pnl0i the problem obtained from P by
replacing li by l0i and such that the preferences of agent i on [max fli; l0ig ; ui] coincide in
both problems. Similar notation is used for Pnu0i; Pnl0; Pn i and so on. Besides given
P 2 P and S  N; we denote by PS the problem P when considering only agents in S;
namely, PS = (S; t; (li)i2S; (ui)i2S; (i)i2S) :
A problem where all agents have single-peaked preferences on [0;+1) is known as the
division problem; i.e., for all i 2 N , li = 0, ui = +1, and (P.1) and (P.2) hold.
The set of feasible allocations of problem P is
FA (P ) =

(xi)i2N 2 RN+ j
P
i2N
xi 2 f0; tg and, for each i 2 N; xi 2 f0g [ [li; ui]

:
This set is never empty since the allocation (0; :::; 0) 2 RN+ is always feasible. Besides, there
are problems for which (0; :::; 0) is the unique feasible allocation.
A coalition S  N is admissible (at problem P ) if either S is empty or it is feasible
to divide t among all agents in S; namely, coalition S 6= ; is admissible if there exists
x = (xi)i2S 2 RS+ such that
P
i2S xi = t and li  xi  ui for all i 2 S: Hence, S 6= ; is
admissible if and only if
P
i2S li  t 
P
i2S ui:We denote by A (P ) the set of all admissible
coalitions at problem P . The set A(P ) is non-empty because it always contains the empty
coalition.
A rule f assigns to each problem P 2 P a feasible allocation; that is, f(P ) 2 FA (P )
for all P 2 P. Hence, a rule f can be seen as a systematic way of assigning to each problem
P 2 P two di¤erent but related aspects of the solution of the problem.
First, an admissible coalition cf (P ) 2 A(P ) where
cf (P ) = fi 2 N j fi (P ) 2 [li; ui]g:
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We refer to the agents in cf (P ) as participants. Often, and when no confusion arises because
the problem P will be obvious from the context we write cf instead of cf (P ). Obviously,
if i =2 cf (P ), then fi (P ) = 0. Besides, if li = 0; then i 2 cf (P ).
Second, how the amount t is divided among the participants; i.e., if cf (P ) 6= ; then,P
i2cf (P )
fi (P ) = t:
We will see later that to identify rules satisfying appealing properties we may have
some freedom when choosing one among all admissible coalitions while the properties will
determine a unique way of dividing the amount of the good among the participants.
3 Properties of Rules
In this section we dene several properties that a rule may satisfy. The rst four are basic
and standard properties already used in many axiomatic analysis of the division problem.
The last two are bound monotonicity, which restricts how the rule should change when the
upper or lower bound of an agent changes, and independence of irrelevant coalitions, which
restricts how the participants should be chosen.
A rule is e¢ cient if it always selects a Pareto optimal allocation.
Efficiency (ef ) For each P 2 P there is no (yi)i2N 2 FA(P ) with the property that
yi i fi (P ) for all i 2 N and yj j fj (P ) for some j 2 N:
Rules require each agent to report a single-peaked preference on f0g [ [li; ui]. A rule
is strategy-proof if it is always in the best interest of agents to reveal their preferences
truthfully; namely, truth-telling is a weakly dominant strategy in the direct revelation
game induced by the rule.
Strategy-proofness (sp) For each P 2 P ; i 2 N , and 0i on f0g [ [li; ui],
fi (P ) i fi (Pn 0i) :
Given a problem P we say that agent i 2 N manipulates f at prole  via 0i if fi (Pn 0i) i
fi (P ).
A rule satises strong equal treatment of equals if identical agents receive the same
allotment.
Strong equal treatment of equals (sete) For every P 2 P such that there are
i; j 2 N , i 6= j; and i=j then, fi (P ) = fj (P ) :
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Strong equal treatment of agents is incompatible with e¢ ciency. To see that, consider
any problem P where N = f1; 2; 3g; t = 10; (li; pi; ui) = (4; 5; 10) for i = 1; 2; 3; and
1=2=3 : Since the allotment (103 ; 103 ; 103 ) =2 FA(P ) any f satisfying strong equal treat-
ment of equals has the property that cf = ; and fi(P ) = 0 for all i = 1; 2; 3: However,
(0; 5; 5) Pareto dominates (0; 0; 0): Thus e¢ ciency and strong equal treatment of equals are
incompatible. For this reason, we restrict our attention to the weaker notion of the property
requiring that only equal participants must be treated equally. The example above suggests
that a rule satisfying equal treatment of equal (participants) will have to use some criteria
to select among the three allotments (0; 5; 5); (5; 0; 5); and (5; 5; 0) (and corresponding set
of participants); but we will deal with that later.
A rule satises equal treatment of equals if identical participants receive the same
allotment.
Equal treatment of equals (ete) For every P 2 P such that there are i; j 2 N ,
i 6= j; i=j; and i; j 2 cf (P ) then, fi (P ) = fj (P ) :
We note that (sete) and (ete) coincide with the standard property of equal treatment
of equals when they are applied to classical division problems.
A rule is consistent if the following requirement holds. Apply the rule to a given problem
and assume that a subset of agents leave with their corresponding allotments. Consider
the new problem formed by the set of agents that remain with the same preferences that
they had in the original problem and the total amount of the good minus the sum of the
allotments received by the subset of agents that already left. Then, the rule does not require
to reallocate the allotments of the remaining agents.
Consistency (cons) For each problem P 2 P, each non-empty subset of agents S  N;
and each i 2 S,
fi (P ) = fi
 
S; t  P
j2cf (P )nS
fj (P ) ; (li)i2S ; (ui)i2S ; (i)i2S
!
:
We now introduce the property of bound monotonicity, which imposes restrictions on
how the rule changes when the upper or lower bounds of the interval of feasible allotments
of one agent changes. Take a problem P where the upper bound of agent k decreases to
u0k < uk without changing his preferences (i.e., 0k coincides with k on [lk; u0k]). A natural
notion of bound monotonicity says the following. First, assume that fk(P )  u0k; then,
f(P ) is also feasible in Pnu0k: Bound monotonicity says that f selects the same allocation
in both problems (i.e., f(Pnu0k) = f(P )): Second, assume that u0k < fk(P ); then, f(P ) is
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not feasible in Pnu0k: If we can divide t in Pnu0k among the same set of agents as in P (i.e.,
cf (P ) 2 A (Pnu0k)) then, bound monotonicity says that agent k receives his new upper
bound (fk(Pnu0k) = u0k) and the rest of agents receive an allotment that is not smaller than
the one they received in P (i.e., fi(Pnu0k)  fi(P ) for all i 2 Nnfkg). If u0k is so small that
we can not divide t in Pnu0k among the same set of agents as in P (i.e., cf (P ) =2 A (Pnu0k))
then, bound monotonicity says nothing. We apply the same ideas to the lower bound.
We now dene the property of bound monotonicity formally.
Bound monotonicity (bm)
(bm.1) Let P; Pnu0k 2 P be such that u0k < uk; and cf (P ) 2 A (Pnu0k) : Then, cf (Pnu0k) =
cf (P ) and
fi (Pnu0k)  min ffi (P ) ; u0ig for each i 2 N; (1)
where u0i = ui for all i 2 Nn fkg :
(bm.2) Let P; Pnl0k 2 P be such that lk < l0k; and cf (P ) 2 A (Pnl0k) : Then, cf (Pnl0k) = cf (P )
and
fi (Pnl0k)  max ffi (P ) ; l0ig for each i 2 N; (2)
where l0i = li for all i 2 Nn fkg :
The property of bound monotonicity can be seen also as a weak property of solidarity.
Thomson (1994b) says: A condition that is natural however is that agents all lose together
or all gain together when the amount to divide increases, in fact when it increases or
decreases. The general requirement that all agents be a¤ected in the same direction "as their
environment changes" is the essence of solidarity.We can apply this solidarity principle
when the environment changes because the upper bound of some agent changes (the case
of a change in the lower bound is analogous). Take a problem P where the upper bound
of agent k decreases to u0k < uk without changing his preferences. First, assume that
fk(P )  u0k then, f(P ) is also feasible in Pnu0k: Then, we select the same allocation in both
problems (in this case we do the same as with (bm)): Second, assume that u0k < fk(P ) then,
f(P ) is not feasible in Pnu0k: If cf (P ) 2 A (Pnu0k) then, agent k receives his new upper
bound (fk(Pnu0k) = u0k) and the rest of agents either all are better o¤ or all are worse o¤.
Namely, either
fi(Pnu0k) i fi (P ) for each i 2 Nn fkg or
fi (P ) i fi(Pnu0k) for each i 2 Nn fkg :
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Obviously, bound monotonicity does not imply solidarity and solidarity does not imply
bound monotonicity. Nevertheless if a rule satisfy (ef ); then solidarity implies (bm) but the
other implication does not hold.3 Thus, we can see (bm) as a weaker version of solidarity.
A rule satises independence of irrelevant coalitions if the following requirement holds.
Consider two problems where the set of admissible coalitions of the rst one is contained in
the set of admissible coalitions of the second one. Assume that the coalition chosen by the
rule in the second problem is admissible for the rst one. Then, the rule chooses the same
coalition of participants in the two problems. This property is inspired in the well-known
principle of independence of irrelevant alternatives. Nash (1950) dened it, in bargaining
problems, as follows. Suppose that the set of admissible outcomes of the bargaining problem
S 0 is a subset of the set of admissible outcomes of the bargaining problem S: Besides, the
solution of S belongs to S 0: Then, the solution of S 0 must be the solution of S: Notice that
we are just applying the same principle to the function cf :
Independence of irrelevant coalitions (iic) For any two problems P; P 0 2 P
such that cf (P ) 2 A (P 0)  A (P ) then,
cf (P 0) = cf (P ) :
4 The Uniform Principle: Two Characterizations
In this section we present the two main results of the paper.
The uniform rule U on problems without constraints (see Sprumont (1991)) tries to allo-
cate the good as equally as possible, keeping the e¢ ciency bounds binding (all agents have
to be rationed in the same direction). The feasible uniform rule, on the subclass of division
problems under constraints with the property that the set of all agents is an admissible
coalition, does the same than U but it takes also into account the feasibility constraints.
We show in Theorem 1 that the feasible uniform rule is the unique rule satisfying e¢ ciency,
strategy-proofness, equal treatment of equals, and bound monotonicity on this subclass of
problems.
Let P be the set of division problems under constraints with the property that the set
of all agents is an admissible coalition; namely,
P =

P 2 P j P
i2N
li  t 
P
i2N
ui

:
3We omit the non trivial proof of this statement.
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Feasible uniform rule The feasible uniform rule U on P is dened as follows.
For each P 2 P and i 2 N;
Ui (P ) =
8><>:
min fpi;maxfli; gg if
P
j2N
pj  t
max fpi;minfui; gg if
P
j2N
pj < t;
where  is the unique number satisfying
P
j2N Uj (P ) = t:
Remark 1 Consider the problem P = (N; t; l; u;) 2 P and a division problem without
constraints (N; t;0) (i.e., l0i = 0 and u0i = +1 for all i 2 N) such that for each i 2 N; 0i
coincides with i on [li; ui] and U (N; t;0) 2 FA (P ) : Then, U (N; t;0) = U (P ) : Thus,
the feasible uniform rule U can be considered as an extension of the uniform rule from
division problems without constraints to P. Observe that the extension of the uniform
rule to problems with voluntary participation presented in Bergantiños, Massó, and Neme
(2012b) does not have this property. Let us clarify this with an example. Suppose that
N = f1; 2g ; t = 10; l = (1; 3), u = (8; 8) and p = (6; 6) : Thus, U (P ) = (5; 5) whereas the
rule in Bergantiños, Massó, and Neme (2012b) chooses (4; 6); namely, it increases uniformly
the allotments starting from l.
Theorem 1 in Ching (1994) provides a characterization of the uniform rule in the classical
division problem with (ef ); (ete); and (sp). In Theorem 1 below we prove that if we add
(bm) we have a characterization of the feasible uniform rule in P: Thus our result can be
seen as an extension of Chings result.
Theorem 1 The feasible uniform rule U on P is the unique rule satisfying e¢ ciency,
strategy-proofness, equal treatment of equals, and bound monotonicity. Besides, the four
properties are independent.
Proof See Subsection 6.1.
Remark 2 Unfortunately, U does not satisfy solidarity on P. Consider a problem P 2 P
where N = f1; 2; 3g ; t = 15; l = (0; 0; 0) ; u = (10; 10; 10) ; p = (6; 6; 6) ; 5 2 7 and 7 3 5:
Thus, U (P ) = (5; 5; 5) : Let u01 = 1: Then p
0
1 = 1 and hence p
0
1 + p2 + p3 = 13: Now
U(Pnu01) = (1; 7; 7) ; which means that U does not satisfy solidarity.
Therefore, it is not possible to use solidarity instead of (bm) in our results. Assume
that a rule f satises solidarity, (ef ); (ete); and (sp): Thus, f also satises (bm); (ef );
(ete); and (sp): By Theorem 1, f = U; which is a contradiction because U does not satisfy
solidarity. Hence, the properties of (ef ); (sp); (ete); and solidarity are incompatible in P.
This fact is not surprising because solidarity is incompatible with some properties in the
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classical division problem, see for instance Thomson (1994b). The example suggests that
in our model the incompatibility comes mainly from (sp): As Lemma 1.2 will establish,
(ef ) and (sp) imply own peak monotonicity while solidarity requires the use of the whole
preferences.
We now consider the general case. We rst extend the feasible uniform rule to P. Let
P be a problem in P. An extended uniform rule selects at P the feasible set of participants
by maximizing a given order  (a complete, antisymmetric and transitive binary relation)
on N , restricted to the family of admissible coalitions A(P )  N , and then it applies the
feasible uniform rule to this selected set of participants to choose their allotments.
Extended Uniform Rule Let  be an order on N . The extended uniform rule on
P induced by the order  on N ; denoted by U; is dened as follows. For each P 2 P and
i 2 N;
Ui (P ) =
(
Ui(PcU (P )) if i 2 cU (P )
0 if i =2 cU (P ) ;
where cU

(P ) 2 A (P ) and cU (P ) S for all S 2 A (P ) ncU (P ) :
Obviously, the family of extended uniform rules on P is large. We are interested in
the subfamily of rules that satisfy e¢ ciency, strategy-proofness, equal treatment of equals,
bound monotonicity, consistency and independence of irrelevant coalitions. To identify it
we restrict the order  on N to satisfy the properties of monotonicity and responsiveness.
Denition 1 We say that an order  on N is
(i) monotonic if for all S 2 N and i =2 S; (S [ fig) S; and
(ii) responsive if for all S; T 2 N and i =2 S [ T , ST implies (S [ fig)  (T [ fig) :
If  is monotonic, then cU

is maximal. Namely, if cU

(P )  S; then S is not admissible.
Theorem 2 below characterizes the set of extended uniform rules that choose the admis-
sible coalition according to a monotonic and responsive order  on N . The way in which
we obtain  is similar to the one used in Bergantiños, Massó, and Neme (2012b).
Theorem 2 Let f be a rule on P. Then, f satises e¢ ciency, strategy-proofness, equal
treatment of equals, bound monotonicity, consistency, and independence of irrelevant coali-
tions if and only if f = U for some monotonic and responsive order  on N . Besides,
the six properties are independent.
Proof See Subsection 6.2.
Remark 3. We have formulated Theorem 2 in terms of the uniform rule but the result
is more general. The proof of Theorem 2 establishes that the following statement holds.
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Assume that a rule on P can be characterized with a list of properties that include (ef )
and (bm): Then, this rule can be extended to the general domain P (as with U) by adding
(cons) and (iic) to the list of properties characterizing the rule on P.
5 Final Remarks
In this section we present some other properties that the uniform rule satises in the classical
division problem. While some of them are satised by any extended uniform rule in our
setting some others are not. Nevertheless, if we proceed by weakening such properties as
we did with the principle of equal treatment of equals, any extended uniform rule satises
the new formulations of the corresponding weaker principles.
A rule is non-bossy if whenever an agent receives the same allotment at two problems
that are identical except for the preferences of this agent, then the allotments of all the
other agents also coincide at the two problems. Formally,
Non-bossy For each problem P , each i 2 N , and each0i such that fi (P ) = fi (Pn 0i) ;
then fj (P ) = fj (Pn 0i) for all j 2 Nn fig :
A rule is own-peak monotonic if when the peak of an agent increases and the rest of the
problem remains the same, this agent does not receive less.
Own-peak monotonicity For all P; (Pn 0i) 2 P, p0i  pi implies fi(Pn 0i) 
fi (P ) :
A rule is tops-only when it depends only on the peaks of the preferences.
Tops-only For all P; (Pn 0) 2 P, pi = p0i for all i 2 N implies f (P ) = f(Pn 0):
A rule satises maximality if the set of participants is always maximal according to
set-wise inclusion.
Maximality For any P 2 P and T  N such that cf (P )  T , T is not an admissible
coalition for P:
To show that any extended uniform rule on P induced by a monotonic and responsive
order  on N satises the above properties is straightforward. We state this without proof
as Proposition 1 below.
Proposition 1. For each monotonic and responsive order  on N , the extended uniform
rule U is non-bossy, own-peak monotonic, tops-only, and satises maximality.
We now introduce some properties that in the strong version (as in classical division
problems) no extended uniform rule on P does satisfy. Nevertheless, a weaker version of
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them (obtained by weakening the properties as we did with equal treatment of equals)
are satised by every extended uniform rule on P. In all cases, when applied to classical
division problems, the strong and the weak versions coincide.
The basic principle under envy-freeness is that no agent can strictly prefer the allotment
received by another agent.
Strong envy freeness For each P 2 P and each i; j 2 N , fi (P ) i fj (P ) :
We weaken this notion in two ways. First, we only require to compare allotments of
participants (as in the case of ete). Second, we admit unfeasible envies (when agent i envies
the allocation of agent j but agent is allocation is not feasible for agent j).
Envy freeness For each P 2 P and each pair of agents i; j 2 cf such that fj (P ) i
fi (P ) ; then the vector of allotments x = (xk)k2cf , where xi = fj (P ) ; xj = fi (P ) ; and
xk = fk (P ) for all k 2 cfnfi; jg has the property that x =2 FA (P ).
A rule is strongly individually rational from equal division if all agents receive an allot-
ment that is at least as good as equal division.
Strongly individual rationality from equal division For each P 2 P and
each i 2 N ,
fi (P ) i t
n
:
We now weaken this principle by applying it only when the equal allotment is feasible.
Individual rationality from equal division For each P 2 P for which ( t
n
; :::; t
n
) 2
FA (P ) then, for all i 2 N ,
fi (P ) i t
n
:
One-sided resource monotonicity says that if the good is scarce, an increase of the
amount to be allotted should make all agents better o¤. Symmetrically, if the good is too
abundant, a decrease of the amount to be allotted should make all agents better o¤.
Strong one-sided resource monotonicity For all P; (Pnt0) 2 P with the prop-
erty that either t  t0  P
i2N
pi or
P
i2N
pi  t0  t then, fi (Pnt0) i fi (P ) for all i 2 N:
We weaken the principle by applying it only when, after changing the amount to be
divided, the set of admissible coalitions does not change.
One-sided resource monotonicity For all P; (Pnt0) 2 P with the property that
A (P ) = A (Pnt0) and either t  t0  P
i2N
pi or
P
i2N
pi  t0  t then, fi (Pnt0) i fi (P ) for
all i 2 N:
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Proposition 2 Let  be a monotonic and responsive order on N . Then, the extended
uniform rule U does not satisfy strong envy freeness, strong individual rationality from
equal division, and strong one-sided resource monotonicity. Nevertheless, U satises envy
freeness, individual rationality from equal division, and one-sided resource monotonicity.
Proof See Subsection 6.3.
The proof of Proposition 2 establishes the following Corollary.
Corollary 1 There is no rule on P that satises strong individual rationality from equal
division. Moreover, let f be an e¢ cient rule. Then, f neither satises strong envy freeness
nor strong one-sided resource monotonicity on P.
In the classical division problem, e¢ cient allocations are equivalent to same-sideness
allocations; namely,
P
i2N pi  t implies that xi  pi for all i 2 N and
P
i2N pi < t implies
that xi  pi for all i 2 N: Nevertheless, this equivalence does not hold in the division
problem under constraints. But rst, we dene same-sideness in our model.
Same-sideness Let P 2 P, x = (xi)i2N 2 FA (P ) and
cx := fi 2 N j li  xi  uig :
The allocation x satises same-sideness if
P
i2cx pi  t implies that xi  pi for all i 2 cx
and
P
i2cx pi < t implies that xi  pi for all i 2 cx.
We can adapt the denition of maximality for an allocation x simply by replacing cf
by cx in the denition of maximality for a rule f: Next result establishes the relationship
between e¢ ciency and same-sideness.
Proposition 3
(a) If x satises maximality and same-sideness, then x is e¢ cient.
(b) If x is e¢ cient, then x satises same-sideness but it could fail maximality.
The proof of Proposition 3 is straightforward and we omit it. Nevertheless let us clarify
why e¢ ciency does not imply maximality. Assume that S is admissible for x, j =2 S; S[fjg
is admissible for x,
P
i2S pi  t; and
P
i2S[fjg pi > t: Consider a prole of preferences where
agents in S prefer much moreto receive an allotment above their peaks than below, then
x could be e¢ cient even if it is not maximal. However, the reason of why an e¢ cient
allocation is not maximal is because the inclusion of an additional agent j transforms the
problem from
P
i2S pi  t to
P
i2S[fjg pi > t:
4
4Namely, if S is admissible for x; j =2 S; S [ fjg is admissible for x, Pi2S pi  t; and Pi2S[fjg pi  t,
then x is not e¢ cient.
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6 Proofs
We present the proofs of the main results of the paper.
6.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We rst prove that U satises e¢ ciency, strategy-proofness, equal treatment of equals, and
bound monotonicity on P.
(1) U satises (ef ). Fix a problem P 2 P. Assume that there exists x = (xi)i2N 2 FA (P )
with the property that xi i Ui (P ) for all i 2 N: We prove that x = U (P ) : Let i 2 N be
arbitrary. We consider two cases.
1.
P
j2N pj < t: Thus, Ui (P ) = max fpi;minfui; gg : In this case U coincides with the
constrained uniform rule F studied in Bergantiños, Massó, and Neme (2012a). Using
the same arguments used there to prove that F satises (ef ) in the case
P
j2N pj < t,
we can prove that xi = Ui (P ) holds.
2.
P
j2N pj  t: Thus, Ui (P ) = min fpi;maxfli; gg : We consider three cases.
2.1. Ui (P ) = pi: Since xi i Ui (P ) ; it follows that xi = pi:
2.2. Ui (P ) =  < pi. Since xi i Ui (P ) ; by single-peakedness, xi  : Suppose
that xi > : As
P
j2N xj =
P
j2N Uj (P ) = t; there exists k 2 N such that
xk < Uk (P ) : We consider three cases.
2.2.1. Uk (P ) = pk: Then, xk < pk; which contradicts that xk k Uk (P ) :
2.2.2. Uk (P ) =  and  < pk: Then, xk < ; which contradicts, by single-
peakedness, that xk k Uk (P ) :
2.2.3. Uk (P ) = lk: Since x 2 FA (P ) ; xk = 0 and hence Uk (P ) = lk k 0 = xk;
which contradicts xk k Uk (P ) :
Thus, xi =  and hence, xi = Ui(P ):
2.3. Ui (P ) = li > : Since xi i Ui (P ) ; xi  li: Suppose that xi > li: As
P
j2N xj =P
j2N Uj (P ) = t; there exists k 2 N such that xk < Uk (P ) : Similarly to Case
2.2, we obtain a contradiction. Thus, xi = li and hence, xi = Ui(P ):
(2) U satises (sp). Fix a problem P 2 P. Let i 2 N and 0i on [li; ui] be arbitrary. We
prove that Ui (P ) i Ui (Pn 0i) : We consider two cases.
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1.
P
j2N pj < t: Thus, Ui (P ) = max fpi;minfui; gg : In this case U coincides with the
constrained uniform rule F studied in Bergantiños, Massó, and Neme (2012a). Using
the same arguments used there to prove that F satises (sp) in the case
P
j2N pj < t,
we can prove that Ui (P ) i Ui (Pn 0i).
2.
P
j2N pj  t: Thus, Ui (P ) = min fpi;maxfli; gg. We consider three cases.
The proofs of cases 2.1 Ui (P ) = pi and 2.2 Ui (P ) =  < pi are similar to the proofs
that F satises (sp) in Bergantiños, Massó, and Neme (2012a) when
P
j2N pj  t;
and Ui (P ) = pi and Ui (P ) =  < pi; respectively.
We now consider the case 2.3 Ui (P ) = li > : We consider three cases.
2.3.1. p0i  pi: Then,
P
j2Nnfig pj + p
0
i  t: Now Ui (Pn 0i) = min fp0i;maxfli; 0gg :
Since  < li  pi  p0i; it follows that min fp0i;maxfli; gg = li: Hence, 0 = 
and then, Ui (P ) = Ui (Pn 0i) :
2.3.2. p0i < pi and
P
j2Nnfig pj + p
0
i  t: The proof proceeds as in Case 2.3.1.
2.3.3. p0i < pi and
P
j2Nnfig pj + p
0
i < t: Since li  p0i;P
j2Nnfig pj + li < t:
Since t =
P
j2Nnfig Uj (P ) + li and pj  Uj (P ) for all j 2 N;
t Pj2Nnfig pj + li;
a contradiction.
(3) By denition, U satises (ete):
(4) U satises (bm):We rst prove (bm.1 ): Let P and P 0 = Pnu0k be as in the denition of
(bm.1 ): We should prove that
Ui (P
0)  min fUi (P ) ; u0ig for each i 2 N:
We consider two cases.
1.
P
j2N pj < t: Thus, Ui (P ) = max fpi;minfui; gg for all i 2 N: In this case U
coincides with the constrained uniform rule F studied in Bergantiños, Massó, and
Neme (2012a). Using the same arguments used there to prove that F satises (sp) in
the case
P
j2N pj < t, we can prove that (bm.1 ) holds in this case.
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2.
P
j2N pj  t: Thus, Ui (P ) = min fpi;maxfli; gg for all i 2 N: We consider two
cases.
2.1.
P
i2N p
0
i < t: Then, p
0
k = u
0
k < pk  uk: By denition of U; for each i 2 Nnfkg;
Ui (P )  pi = p0i  Ui (P 0) : Besides, p0k  Uk (P 0). Since Uk (P 0) 2 [l0k; u0k] and
u0k = p
0
k, Uk (P
0) = u0k holds.
2.2.
P
i2N p
0
i  t. Then, Ui (P 0) = min fpi;maxfli; 0gg for all i 2 Nnfkg. Since
p0k  pk, 0  : Therefore, for each i 2 Nnfkg; Ui (P 0)  Ui (P ) : To show that
Uk (P
0)  min fUk (P ) ; u0kg holds we consider two cases.
2.2.1. Uk (P )  u0k: Thus, Uk (P ) = Uk (P 0).
2.2.2. Uk (P ) > u0k: Since Uk (P )  pk and preferences are single-peaked, p0k = u0k.
If   pk; then Uk (P ) = maxflk; g: If  > pk; then Uk (P ) = pk: Since
0   we deduce in both cases (  pk and  > pk) that
Uk (P
0) = min fp0k;maxflk; 0gg = p0k = u0k:
We now prove (bm.2 ). Let P and P 0 = Pnl0k be as in the denition of (bm.2 ). We
should prove that
Ui (P
0)  max fUi (P ) ; l0ig for each i 2 N:
We consider two cases.
1.
P
j2N pj < t: Thus, Ui (P ) = max fpi;minfui; gg for all i 2 N: If Uk (P )  l0k;
then U (P ) = U (P 0), by the denition of U: Assume now that Uk (P ) < l0k: Since
pk  Uk (P ), pk < l0k. Hence l0k = p0k: We consider two cases.
1.1.
P
j2N p
0
j > t: Then, for all i 2 Nn fkg ;
Ui (P
0) = min fp0i;maxfl0i; 0gg  p0i = pi  Ui (P ) :
Since l0k = p
0
k;
Uk (P
0) = min fp0k;maxfl0k; 0gg = l0k:
1.2.
P
j2N p
0
j  t: Then, Ui (P 0) = max fp0i;minfui; 0gg for all i 2 N: Since pk < p0k,
0  : Thus, for all i 2 Nn fkg ;
Ui (P
0) = max fp0i;minfu0i; 0gg
= max fpi;minfui; 0gg
 max fpi;minfui; gg
= Ui (P ) :
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We consider two cases for agent k.
1.2.1.   pk: Since 0    pk < l0k = p0k  uk;
Uk (P
0) = max fp0k;minfuk; 0gg = p0k = l0k:
1.2.2.  > pk: Since Uk (P ) < l0k  u0k = uk;
Uk (P ) = max fpk;minfuk; gg = :
Since 0   = Uk (P ) < l0k = p0k  uk;
Uk (P
0) = max fp0k;minfuk; 0gg = p0k = l0k:
2.
P
j2N pj  t: Thus, Ui (P ) = min fpi;maxfli; gg for all i 2 N: If Uk (P )  l0k; then
U (P ) = U (P 0) ; by the denition of U: Assume now that Uk (P ) < l0k: Notice that
p0k  pk: Thus,
P
j2N p
0
j  t. Hence, Ui (P 0) = min fp0i;maxfl0i; 0gg for all i 2 N:
Then, 0  : Proceeding as in Case 1.2, we deduce that Ui (P 0)  Ui (P ) for all
i 2 Nn fkg : We consider three cases for agent k:
2.1. Uk (P ) = lk: Then, lk  : Since 0    lk = Uk (P ) < l0k  p0k,
Uk (P
0) = min fp0k;maxfl0k; 0gg = l0k:
2.2. Uk (P ) =  > lk: Then pk  : Since 0   = Uk (P ) < l0k  p0k,
Uk (P
0) = min fp0k;maxfl0k; 0gg = l0k:
2.3. Uk (P ) = pk: Then, pk  : Since pk = Uk (P ) < l0k, pk < p0k = l0k. Since 0  
we deduce that in the two possible cases (either 0  l0k or 0 > l0k) that
Uk (P
0) = min fp0k;maxfl0k; 0gg = l0k:
We now prove that U is the unique rule satisfying the four properties on P. We do it
by proving the following ve lemmata.
Lemma 1.1 Let f be a rule satisfying (ef ) and (bm) on P and let P 2 P: Then,
cf (P ) = N:
Proof Let P 2 P. Consider the problem P 0 = (N; t; l0; u0;0) ; where for all i 2 N;
l0i = 0 and u
0
i = max fui; tg. Besides, for all i 2 N , 0i coincides with i on [li; ui] :
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Obviously, cf (P ) = N and by (ef );
P
i2N fi (P
0) = t: Consider now the problem P 0nl1. By
(bm);
cf
 
P 0nl1

= cf
 
P 0

= N:
Consider now the problem P 0n fl1; u1g (if u01 = u1; then the next statement holds trivially).
By (bm);
cf
 
P 0n fl1; u1g

= cf
 
P 0nl1

= N:
Repeating this argument with agents 2; :::; n; we obtain that cf (P ) = N: 
An immediate consequence of Lemma 1.1 is that if f satises (ef ), (bm), and (ete) on
P, then for all P 2 P such that i=j we have that fi (P ) = fj (P ).
Next lemma is an extension of Lemma 1 in Ching (1994) for the classical division problem
to the division problem under constraints.
Lemma 1.2 Let f be a rule satisfying (ef ) and (sp) on P. Then, f is own-peak
monotonic5.
Proof Let P; Pn 0j2 P be such that p0j  pj: To obtain a contradiction, assume
fj (P ) < fj(Pn 0j): (3)
We consider two cases.
1.
P
i2N pi  t: By (ef ) and Proposition 3, pi  fi (P ) for all i 2 N: Hence,
p0j  pj  fj (P ) < fj(Pn 0j);
which implies, by single-peakedness, that fj (P ) 0j fj(Pn 0j); a contradiction with
(sp).
2.
P
i2N pi > t: By (ef ) and Proposition 3,
fi (P )  pi for all i 2 N: (4)
We consider two cases.
2.1.
P
i6=j pi + p
0
j  t: By (ef ) and Proposition 3, for all i 6= j; fi(Pn 0j)  pi and
fj(Pn 0j)  p0j: Hence, by (3),
fj (P ) < fj(Pn 0j)  p0j  pj;
which implies, by single-peakedness, that fj(Pn 0j) j fj (P ) ; a contradiction
with (sp).
5See Section 5 for a formal denition of own-peak monotonicity.
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2.2.
P
i6=j pi + p
0
j < t: By (ef ) and Proposition 3, for all i 6= j; pi  fi(Pn 0j) and
p0j  fj(Pn 0j): Thus, p0j  fj (P ); otherwise, by (4),
t =
X
i2N
fi (P ) <
X
i6=j
pi + p
0
j
a contradiction. Hence,
p0j  fj (P ) < fj(Pn 0j);
which implies, by single-peakedness, that fj (P ) 0j fj(Pn 0j); a contradiction
with (sp). 
Next lemma is an extension of Lemma 2 in Ching (1994) for the classical division problem
to the division problem under constraints.
Lemma 1.3 Let f be a rule satisfying (ef ), (sp), and (bm) on P. Then, for all P 2 P
and j 2 N :
(a) If pj < fj (P ) and 0j satises 0  p0j  fj (P ), then fj(Pn 0j) = fj (P ) :
(b) If fj (P ) < pj and 0j satises fj (P )  p0j  t, then fj(Pn 0j) = fj (P ) :
Proof Let f be an (ef) and (sp) rule, P 2 P and j 2 N .
(a) Assume pj < fj (P ) and let 0j be such that 0  p0j  fj (P ) : By (ef ) and Lemma 1.1,
Proposition 3 implies that
pi  fi (P ) for all i 2 N: (5)
Since p0j  fj (P ) ; (5) implies X
i2cfnfjg
pi + p
0
j 
X
i2cf
fi (P ) = t:
We now show that fj(Pn 0j) = fj (P ) : To obtain a contradiction, assume otherwise and
consider two cases.
1. fj (P ) < fj(Pn 0j): Then,
p0j  fj (P ) < fj(Pn 0j);
which implies, by single-peakedness, that
fj (P ) 0j fj(Pn 0j);
contradicting (sp).
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2. fj (P ) > fj(Pn 0j): We consider two cases.
2.1. fj(Pn 0j)  pj: Then,
pj  fj(Pn 0j) < fj (P ) :
By single-peakedness,
fj(Pn 0j) j fj (P ) ;
contradicting (sp).
2.2. fj(Pn 0j) < pj: Then, p0j > 0 and
fj(Pn 0j) < pj < fj (P ) : (6)
By Lemma 1.1, fj(Pn 0j) 2 [lj; uj]. Let 00j be such that p00j = pj and
fj(Pn 0j) 00j fj (P ) : (7)
By Lemma 1.2, f is own-peak monotonic. Hence, fj(Pn 00j ) = fj (P ) : By (7),
fj(Pn 0j) 00j fi(Pn 00j );
contradicting (sp).
(b) We omit the proof since it follows a symmetric argument to the one used to prove (a).

Lemma 1.4 Let f be a rule satisfying (ef ), (ete) and (bm) on P. Assume Pn 0fi;jg2
P is such that uk = t for all k 2 N and 0i and 0j coincide on [max fli; ljg ; t] : Then, it
is not possible that simultaneously
fi(Pn 0fi;jg) < Ui(Pn 0fi;jg)
and
fj(Pn 0fi;jg) > Uj(Pn 0fi;jg)
hold.
Proof We consider three cases.
1. li = lj: By Lemma 1.1, cf (Pn 0fi;jg) = N: Thus, i and j belong to cf (Pn 0fi;jg):
Since 0i and 0j coincide on [max fli; ljg ; t] and f and U satisfy (ete), the statement
holds trivially.
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2. li < lj: Let lj = li and consider the preference j of agent j on [lj ; uj] that coincides
with 0i on [li; ui] = [lj ; uj]: Obviously,
Pnlj ;0i;j	 2 P:
By Lemma 1.1,
cf (Pnlj ;0i;j	) = N:
By (ete);
fi(Pn

lj ;0i;j
	
) = fj(Pn

lj ;0i;j
	
) and
Ui(Pn

lj ;0i;j
	
) = Uj(Pn

lj ;0i;j
	
): (8)
Notice that the original problem Pn 0fi;jg can be obtained from Pn

lj ;0i;j
	
by
increasing the lower bound of agent j from lj to lj: We consider three cases.
2.1. lj  min

fj(Pn

lj ;0i;j
	
); Uj(Pn

lj ;0i;j
	
)
	
: Since the two rules satisfy
(bm),
f(Pn 0fi;jg) = f(Pn

lj ;0i;j
	
) and
U(Pn 0fi;jg) = U(Pn

lj ;0i;j
	
):
Thus, the statement holds trivially.
2.2. min

fj(Pn

lj ;0i;j
	
); Uj(Pn

lj ;0i;j
	
)
	
< lj
 maxfj(Pnlj ;0i;j	); Uj(Pnlj ;0i;j	)	 :
Assume that6
fj(Pn

lj ;0i;j
	
) < lj  Uj(Pn

lj ;0i;j
	
): (9)
By (8)
fi(Pn

lj ;0i;j
	
) < Ui(Pn

lj ;0i;j
	
): (10)
Since the two rules satisfy (bm),
fj(Pn 0fi;jg) = lj; (11)
fi(Pn 0fi;jg)  fi(Pn

lj ;0i;j
	
); and (12)
U(Pn 0fi;jg) = U(Pn

lj ;0i;j
	
): (13)
6The proof of the other case is similar because we only use properties that the two rules satisfy.
24
Thus, by (11), (9), and (13),
fj(Pn 0fi;jg) < Uj(Pn 0fi;jg)
and, by (12), (10), and (13),
fi(Pn 0fi;jg) < Ui(Pn 0fi;jg):
Hence, the statement holds.
2.3. max

fj(Pn

lj ;0i;j
	
); Uj(Pn

lj ;0i;j
	
)
	
< lj: Since the two rules satisfy
(bm),
fj(Pn 0fi;jg) = lj and
Uj(Pn 0fi;jg) = lj;
which means that the statement holds trivially.
3. li > lj: The proof proceeds as in Case 2, after changing the roles of i and j. 
Lemma 1.5 Let f be a rule satisfying (ef ), (sp), (ete), and (bm) on P: Then, f = U:
Proof Let P 2 P be arbitrary. We want to show that f(P ) = U(P ): Since f is (bm)
we can assume through the proof that ui  t for all i 2 N . Otherwise, if uk > t for some
agent k take u0k = t; by (bm),
f (Pnu0k) = f (P ) :
Assume rst that
P
i2N pi  t: By (ef ) and Proposition 3, fi (P )  pi for all i 2 N:
Let u11 = t and consider any 11 dened on [l1; t] that coincides with 1 on [l1; u1] and
the peak of 1 and 11 (we call it p11) coincide. For each i 2 Nn f1g dene 1i=i and
u1i = ui: Notice that P can be obtained from P
1 = Pn fu1;1g by decreasing the upper
bound of 1 from t to u1: By (bm);
fi (P )  min

fi
 
P 1

; ui
	
for each i 2 N: (14)
Since
P
i2N p
1
i =
P
i2N pi  t and f satises (ef), by Proposition 3, fi (P 1)  pi for all
i 2 N: Since pi  ui for all i 2 N; by (14),
fi (P )  fi
 
P 1

for all i 2 N:
Hence,
f
 
P 1

= f (P ) :
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Let u22 = t and consider any 22 dened on [l2; t] that coincides with 2 on [l2; u2] and
the peak of 2 and 22 coincide. For each i 2 Nn f2g dene 2i=i and u2i = u1i : Let
P 2 = (N; t; l; u2;2) : Analogously to the previous case,
f
 
P 2

= f
 
P 1

= f (P ) :
Repeating this argument we obtain that f (P n) = f (P ) : Thus, we can assume that
ui = t for all i 2 N:
Without loss of generality assume that p1  p2  :::  pn: To obtain a contradiction,
assume that U (P ) 6= f (P ) : Then, there exists i1 2 N such that
Ui1 (P ) < fi1 (P )  pi1  p1: (15)
Step 1: Take 0i1 dened on [li1 ; t] such that it coincides with 1 on [max fl1; li1g ; t]
and the peak of 0i1 (denoted by p0i1) is also p1: Let P i
1
= Pn 0i1 : By (15), we can apply
Lemma 1.3 (b) with f = U and j = i1. Then,
Ui1(P
i1) = Ui1 (P ) : (16)
By Lemma 1.2, f is own-peak monotonic. Since pi1  p0i1 ;
fi1 (P )  fi1(P i1): (17)
By (16), (15), and (17)
Ui1(P
i1) < fi1(P
i1):
Step 2: Then, there exists i2 2 Nnfi1g such that
fi2(P
i1) < Ui2(P
i1): (18)
Take 0i2 dened on [li2 ; t] such that 0i2 coincides with 0i1 on [max fli1 ; li2g ; t] and the
peak of 0i2 (denoted by p0i2) is also p0i1 (= p1) : Let P i
1i2 = P i
1n 0i2 : Since U satises (ef ),
by Proposition 3, Ui2(P i
1
)  pi2 = pi1i2 : By (18), fi2(P i
1
) < pi2 : Besides, p0i1 = p1  pi2. By
Lemma 1.3 (b) applied to f and j = i2 we deduce that
fi2(P
i1i2) = fi2(P
i1): (19)
By Lemma 1.2, f is own-peak monotonic. Since pi2  p0i2 ;
Ui2(P
i1)  Ui2(P i1i2): (20)
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By (19), (18), and (20)
fi2(P
i1i2) < Ui2(P
i1i2):
By Lemma 1.4,
fi1(P
i1i2)  Ui1(P i1i2):
Step 3: Then, there must exist i3 2 Nnfi1; i2g such that
Ui3(P
i1i2) < fi3(P
i1i2): (21)
Take 0i3 dened on [li3 ; t] such that 0i3 coincides with 0i2 on [max fli1 ; li2 ; li3g ; t] and
the peak of 0i3 (denoted by p0i3) is also p0i1 (= p1) : Let P i
1i2i3 = P i
1i2n 0i3 : By (21),
fi3(P
i1i2) < pi3 : Besides, p0i1 = p1  pi3. By Lemma 1.3 (b) applied to f = U and j = i3 we
deduce that
Ui3(P
i1i2i3) = Ui3(P
i1i2): (22)
By Lemma 1.2, f is own-peak monotonic. Since pi3  p0i3 ;
fi3(P
i1i2)  fi3(P i1i2i3): (23)
By (22), (21), and (23)
Ui3(P
i1i2i3) < fi3(P
i1i2i3):
By applying Lemma 1.4 to the pairs i3; i1 and i3; i2 we obtain
Ui1(P
i1i2i3)  fi1(P i1i2i3).
and
Ui2(P
i1i2i3)  fi2(P i1i2i3):
Continuing with this procedure, at Step n, we obtain that either
Uin (Pn 0N) < fin (Pn 0N) and
Uij (Pn 0N)  fij (Pn 0N) for all j 2 Nn fing
or else
fin (Pn 0N) < Uin (Pn 0N) and
fij (Pn 0N)  Uij (Pn 0N) for all j 2 Nn fing
In both cases we have a contradiction becauseX
i2N
fi (Pn 0N) =
X
i2N
Ui (Pn 0N) = t:
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Assume now that
P
i2N pi < t. By (ef ) and Proposition 3, fi (P )  pi for all i 2 N:
We dene P 0 = Pnl0 where l0i = 0 for all i 2 N: Obviously, P 0 2 P: Let P0 be the
subdomain of P given by problems P with the property that li = 0 for all i 2 N: In
Theorem 1 of Bergantiños, Massó, and Neme (2012a) it is proved that there is a unique
rule on P0 satisfying (ef ), (sp), (ete), and upper bound monotonicity. This rule is called
the constrained uniform rule and for all i 2 N it is dened as follows. For all P 2 P0 and
i 2 N;
Fi (P ) =
(
min f; pig if
P
j2N pj  t
min fmax f; pig ; uig if
P
j2N pj < t;
where  is such that
P
j2N Fj(P ) = t. Since (bm.1 ) coincides with upper bound monotonic-
ity on P0; f coincides with F on P0: Thus, for all i 2 N;
fi
 
P 0

= min fmax f; pig ; uig ;
where  satises
P
j2N fj (P
0) = t: Besides, for all i 2 N;
Ui
 
P 0

= max fpi;minfui; gg ;
where  satises
P
j2N fj (P
0) = t: It is immediate to see that for each ;
min fmax f; pig ; uig = max fpi;minfui; gg :
Thus,  = . Hence, for all i 2 N; fi (P 0) = Ui (P 0) :
Let P 1 = P 0nl1: Since P 1 and P 0 belong to P; by (bm),
f1
 
P 1
  maxf1  P 0 ; l1	 and
fi
 
P 1
  maxfi  P 0 ; 0	 for i 6= 1:
Since f1 (P 0) = U1 (P 0)  p1  l1 we have that f (P 1) = f (P 0) :
Let P 2 = P 1nl2: Since P 1 and P 2 belong to P; by (bm),
f2
 
P 2
  maxf2  P 1 ; l2	 and
fi
 
P 2
  maxfi  P 1 ; 0	 for i 6= 2:
Since f2 (P 1) = f2 (P 0) = U2 (P 0)  p2  l2 we have that f (P 2) = f (P 1) :
Repeating this argument for all i = 3; :::; n we have that f (P n) = f (P 0) : Since P n = P ,
for all i 2 N;
fi (P ) = fi
 
P 0

= Ui
 
P 0

= max fpi;minfui; gg = Ui (P ) :
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This concludes the proof of Theorem 1s characterization.
We now prove that the four properties are independent.
 (ef ) is independent of the other properties.
We dene the rule f 1 as follows. Let P 2 P. For each i 2 N;
f 1i (P ) = median fli; ; uig ;
where  is such that
P
i2N fi (P ) = t. Then, f
1 satises (sp), (ete), and (bm) but
fails (ef ).
 (sp) is independent of the other properties.
We dene the rule f 2 as follows. Let P 2 P. For each i 2 N;
f 2i (P ) =
8><>:
pi +min f; ui   pig if
P
i2N
pi < t
Ui (P ) if
P
i2N
pi  t;
where  is such that
P
i2N f
2
i (P ) = t: Then, f
2 satises (ef ), (ete), and (bm) but
fails (sp).
 (ete) is independent of the other properties.
We dene f 3 as the priority rule given by the order (1; 2; :::; n) applied to the set
of e¢ cient allocations. Namely, let P 2 P. We dene f 3 formally, by considering
separately the two following cases.
1.
P
i2N pi  t: Take k as the unique agent satisfying that
Pk
i=1 pi +
Pn
i=k+1 li 
t <
Pk+1
i=1 pi +
Pn
i=k+2 li: For each i 2 N;
f 3i (P ) =
8><>:
pi if i  k
t Pki=1 pi  Pni=k+2 li if i = k + 1
li if i  k + 2:
2.
P
i2N pi < t: Take k as the unique agent satisfying that
Pk+1
i=1 pi +
Pn
i=k+2 ui 
t <
Pk
i=1 pi +
Pn
i=k+1 ui: For each i 2 N;
f 3i (P ) =
8><>:
pi if i  k
t Pki=1 pi  Pni=k+2 ui if i = k + 1
ui if i  k + 2:
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Then, f 3 satises (ef ), (sp), and (bm) but fails (ete).
 (bm) is independent of the other properties.
We dene the rule f 4 inspired by the Constant Equal Losses rule used in bankruptcy
problems. Let P 2 P. For each i 2 N;
f 4i (P ) =
(
max fui   ; pig if
P
i2N pi < t
min fmax fli; ui   g ; pig if
P
i2N pi  t;
where  is such that
P
i2N f
4
i (P ) = t: Then, f
4 satises (ef ), (sp), and (ete) but fails
(bm).
6.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Let  be any monotonic and responsive order on N : We prove that U satises (ef ), (sp),
(ete), (bm), (cons) and (iic) on P.
(1) U satises (cons). Let P 2 P, S  N; and i 2 S. We must prove that
Ui (P ) = U

i
 
PU
;S

where PU
;S =
 
S; t  P
j2cU (P )nS
Uj (P ) ; (li)i2S ; (ui)i2S ; (i)i2S
!
:Werst prove that cU
  
PU
;S

=
cU

(P ) \ S: Suppose cU  PU;S 6= cU (P ) \ S. Since cU (P ) \ S 2 A  PU;S ; we have
cU
  
PU
;S


 
cU

(P ) \ S : Obviously, cU  PU;S [  cU (P ) \ (NnS) 2 A (P ) : By de-
nition of U, 
cU

(P )



cU
  
PU
;S
 [  cU (P ) \ (NnS) : (24)
Since  is responsive and cU
  
PU
;S



cU

(P ) \ S,
cU
  
PU
;S
 [  cU (P ) \ (NnS)  cU (P ) \ S [  cU (P ) \ (NnS) = cU (P )
which contradicts cU
  
PU
;S
 6= cU (P ) \ S and (24). Thus, if i =2 cU (P ) \ S, Ui (P ) =
0 = Ui
 
PU
;S

holds. Let i 2 cU (P ) \ S: We consider two cases.
1.
P
j2cU (P )
pj  t: Thus, Uj (P ) = min fpj;maxfll; gg  pj for all j 2 cU (P ) : Then,
P
j2cU(PU;S)
pj 
P
j2cU(PU;S)
Uj (P ) =
P
j2cU (P )\S
Uj (P )
= t  P
j2cU (P )nS
Uj (P ) :
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Thus, Uj
 
PU
;S

= min fpj;maxflj; 0gg for all j 2 cU
 
PU
;S

: SinceX
j2cU (P )\S
Uj
 
PU
;S

= t  P
j2cU (P )nS
Uj (P ) =
X
j2cU (P )\S
Uj (P ) ;
it follows that 0 = . Hence, Ui (P ) = U

i
 
PU
;S

:
2.
P
j2cU (P )
pj < t: The proof uses symmetric arguments to those already used in Case 1
and it is omitted.
(2) U satises (iic). Let P; P 0 2 P be such that cU (P ) 2 A (P 0)  A (P ) : By denition of
cU

(P ), cU

(P ) S for all S 2 A (P ) ncU (P ) : Thus, cU (P ) S for all S 2 A (P 0) ncU (P ) :
Hence, cU

(P 0) = cU

(P ) :
(3) U satises (ef ). Fix a problem P 2 P. Assume that there exists x = (xi)i2N 2 FA (P )
with the property that xi i Ui (P ) for all i 2 N: We prove that x = U (P ) : Since
xi i Ui (P ) for all i 2 cU (P ), xi 2 [li; ui] for all i 2 cU (P ). Since  is monotonic and
cU

(P ) is maximal in FA (P ), xi = 0 = U

i (P ) for all i =2 cU (P ) : Since U satises (cons),
for all i 2 cU (P ) ;
Ui (P ) = U

i
 
PcU (P )

:
Since PcU (P ) 2 P, U coincides with U on PcU (P ) and U satises (ef ) on P; xi = Ui (P )
for all i 2 cU (P ) :
(4) U satises (sp). Let P 2 P; i 2 N and 0i be as in the denition of (sp). We must
prove that Ui (P ) i Ui (Pn 0i) : Let us denote P 0 = Pn 0i : Obviously, A (P 0) = A (P ) :
Since U satises (iic), cU

(P 0) = cU

(P ) : Then, Uj (P ) = U

j (P
0) for all j =2 cU (P ) :
Thus, if i =2 cU (P ) ; Ui (P ) i Ui (P 0) : Since U satises (cons), for all j 2 cU (P ) ;
Uj (P ) = U

j
 
PcU (P )

and Uj (P
0) = Uj

P 0
cU

(P )

: Since PcU (P ) 2 P; P 0cU (P ) 2 P;
U coincides with U on PcU (P ) and P 0cU (P ) ; and U satises (sp) on P; we deduce that
Ui
 
PcU (P )
 i Ui P 0cU (P ) :
(5) U satises (ete). It is obvious from the denition.
(6) U satises (bm). We rst prove that U satises (bm.1 ): Let P; (Pnu0k) 2 P be such that
u0k < uk; and c
U (P ) 2 A (Pnu0k) : We denote P 0 = Pnu0k: Since u0k < uk, A (P 0)  A (P ) :
Since U satises (iic); cU

(P 0) = cU

(P ) : Then, Ui (P ) = 0 = U

i (P
0) for all i =2 cU (P ) :
Thus, for all i =2 cU (P ) ;
Ui (P
0)  min fUi (P ) ; u0ig .
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Since U satises (cons), for all i 2 cU (P ) ; Ui (P ) = Ui
 
PcU (P )

and Ui (P
0) = Ui

P 0
cU

(P )

:
Since PcU (P ) 2 P; P 0cU (P ) 2 P; U coincides with U on PcU (P ) and P 0cU (P ) ; and U satises
(bm.1 ) on P; we deduce that for all i 2 cU (P )
Ui (P
0) = Ui

P 0
cU

(P )

= Ui

P 0
cU

(P )

 minUi  PcU (P ) ; u0i	
= min

Ui
 
PcU (P )

; u0i
	
= min fUi (P ) ; u0ig .
The proof that U satises (bm.2 ) is similar to the proof that U satises (bm.1 ) and
it is omitted.
Let f be a rule satisfying (ef ), (sp), (ete), (bm), (cons) and (iic). We prove that there
exists a monotonic and responsive order  on N for which f = U.
We rst dene a binary relation  on N as in Bergantiños, Massó, and Neme (2012b)
Let S; S 0 2 N . Three cases are possible.
1. S  S 0. Then, set SS 0:
2. S 0  S. Then, set S 0S:
3. There exist agents j 2 SnS 0 and j0 2 S 0nS: Consider any problem P 2 P where
S; S 0  N and for each i 2 N; li = pi = ui; and
pi =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
" if i 2 S \ S 0
"2 if i 2 Sn (S 0 [ fjg)
t  " jS \ S 0j   "2 jSn (S 0 [ fjg)j if i = j
"3 if i 2 S 0n (S [ fj0g)
t  " jS \ S 0j   "3 jS 0n (S [ fj0g)j if i = j0
"4 if i 2 Nn (S [ S 0) :
We choose " > 0 small enough to make sure that 0 < pi < t for all i 2 N and
A (P ) = fS; S 0g : By (ef ), cf (P ) 2 fS; S 0g: Then, if cf (P ) = S set SS 0 and if
cf (P ) = S 0 set S 0S:
Since f satises (iic),  is well dened because it does not depend on the particular
chosen problem, namely given P 0 2 P such that A (P 0) = fS; S 0g we have that cf (P 0) =
cf (P ) : Thus,  is well dened.
By Lemma 11 and Lemma 13 in Bergantiños, Massó, and Neme (2012b),  is complete,
antisymmetric, monotonic, responsive and transitive. By Lemma 12 in Bergantiños, Massó,
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and Neme (2012b) we have that cf (P ) S for all S 2 A(P )ncf (P ) :We should note that in
the proofs of such lemmata the only properties of f used are (ef ), (cons), and (iic).
Lemma 2.1 Let f be a rule satisfying (ef ), (sp), (ete), (bm), (cons), and (iic) and let
 be its corresponding order dened as in Cases 1, 2, and 3 above. Then, f = U:
Proof Let P 2 P be arbitrary and suppose that f and  satisfy the hypothesis of Lemma
2.1. If A(P ) = ;; then cf (P ) = cU(P ) and f(P ) = U(P ) = (0; :::; 0): Assume A(P ) 6= ;:
By (ef ), cf (P ) and cU

(P ) are non-empty. Since S 2 A(PS) implies S 2 A(P ); we have
that A(PS)  A(P ): In particular, cf (P ) 2 A(Pcf (P ))  A(P ): Hence, by (iic), cf (Pcf (P )) =
cf (P ) : Since f satises (cons),
fi (P ) =
(
fi(Pcf (P )) if i 2 cf (P )
0 if i =2 cf (P ) : (25)
Because Pcf (P ) 2 P and f satises (ef ), (sp), (ete), and (bm), by Theorem 1, for all
i 2 cf (P ) ;
fi(Pcf (P )) = U

i (Pcf (P )): (26)
By (25) and (26), f coincides with U: 
This concludes the proof of Theorem 2s characterization.
We now prove that the six properties are independent.
 (ef ) is independent of the other properties.
Let f 1 be dened as in the independence of the properties of Theorem 1. We extend
f 1 to problems where N is not admissible as we did with the uniform rule. Namely,
let  be a monotonic and responsive order on N . We dene f 1; as follows. For any
P 2 P and i 2 N;
f 1;i (P ) =
(
f 1i (Pcf1; ) if i 2 cf
1;
0 if i =2 cf1; ;
where cf
1; 2 A (P ) and cf1;S for all S 2 A (P ) ncf1; :
It is not di¢ cult to prove that f 1; satises all properties but (ef ).
 (sp) is independent of the other properties.
Let f 2 be dened as in the independence of the properties of Theorem 1. Let  be a
monotonic and responsive order on N . We dene f 2; from f 2 as we did with f 1;.
It is not di¢ cult to prove that f 2; satises all properties but (sp).
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 (ete) is independent of the other properties.
Let f 3 be dened as in the independence of the properties of Theorem 1. Let  be a
monotonic and responsive order on N . We dene f 3; from f 3 as we did with f 1;.
It is not di¢ cult to prove that f 3; satises all properties but (ete).
 (bm) is independent of the other properties.
Let f 4 be dened as in the independence of the properties of Theorem 1. Let  be a
monotonic and responsive order on N . We dene f 4; from f 4 as we did with f 1;.
It is not di¢ cult to prove that f 4; satises all properties but (bm).
 (iic) is independent of the other properties.
Let N = f1; 2g and  be such that
f1; 2g  f1g  f2g ;:
We dene f 5 as follows. For all P 2 P ;
f 5(P ) =
(
(0; t) if f2g 2 A(P ); N =2 A(P ); and t  1
U otherwise.
It is not di¢ cult to prove that f 5 satises all properties but (iic).
 (cons) is independent of the other properties.
Let  be a monotonic order on N but not responsive. We dene f 6 = U:
It is not di¢ cult to prove that f 6 satises all properties but (cons).
6.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Let  be any monotonic and responsive order on N :
(1) U satises envy freeness. Let P 2 P and i; j 2 cU be such that Ui (P ) j Uj (P ) :
Since U satises consistency, Uk (P ) = U

k (PcU ) for all k 2 cU

: Thus, we can assume that
cU

= N ; namely, P 2 P and U = U: We consider two cases.
1.
P
k2N pk < t: Then, Uk (P ) = max fpk;minfuk; gg  pk for all k 2 N . Since
Ui (P ) j Uj (P ) ; Uj (P ) = minfuj; g > pj: We consider two cases.
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1.1.  < pi: Since pi  ui; Ui (P ) = pi: Since Ui (P ) j Uj (P ) > pj; by single-
peakedness, Ui (P ) < Uj (P ) : Then,
 < pi = Ui (P ) < Uj (P ) = minfuj; g;
which is a contradiction.
1.2.   pi: Since pi  ui; Ui (P ) = minfui; g: Since Ui (P ) j Uj (P ) ; by single-
peakedness,
minfui; g = Ui (P ) < Uj (P ) = minfuj; g:
Since Ui (P ) =  and Ui (P ) < Uj (P ) are incompatible, we have that Ui (P ) =
ui < Uj (P ) : Thus, Uj (P ) =2 [li; ui] which means that the allotment of j is not
feasible for i:
2.
P
k2N pk  t: Then, Uk (P ) = min fpk;maxflk; gg  pk for all k 2 N . Since
Ui (P ) j Uj (P ) ; Uj (P ) = maxflj; g < pj: We consider two cases.
2.1.   pi: Since li  pi; Ui (P ) = maxfli; g: Since Ui (P ) j Uj (P ) ; by single-
peakedness,
maxfli; g = Ui (P ) > Uj (P ) = maxflj; g:
Since Ui (P ) =  and Ui (P ) > Uj (P ) are incompatible, we have that Ui (P ) =
li > Uj (P ) : Thus, Uj (P ) =2 [li; ui] which means that the allotment of j is not
feasible for i:
2.2.  > pi: Since li  pi; Ui (P ) = pi: Since Ui (P ) j Uj (P ) ; by single-peakedness,
pi = Ui (P ) > Uj (P ) = maxflj; g;
a contradiction with  > pi:
(2) U satises individual rationality from equal division: Let P 2 P be such that ( t
n
; :::; t
n
) 2
FA (P ) : Thus, li  tn  ui for all i 2 N and hence, P 2 P and U = U: We consider two
cases.
1.
P
i2N pi < t: Then, Ui (P ) = max fpi;minfui; gg  pi for all i 2 N . Assume thatP
i2N ui > t (otherwise ui =
t
n
for all i 2 N and the result holds trivially). Since for
all i 2 N; t
n
 ui it follows that for all i 2 N;
max

pi;minfui; tng
	
= max

pi;
t
n
	  t
n
.
Hence,   t
n
: We consider two cases.
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1.1. pi  : Then, Ui (P ) = pi i tn :
1.2. pi < : Then, pi < Ui (P ) =   tn . By single-peakedness, Ui (P ) i tn :
2.
P
i2N pi  t: Then, min fpi;maxfli; gg  pi for all i 2 N . Assume that
P
i2N li < t
(otherwise li = tn for all i 2 N and the result holds trivially). Since for all i 2 N;
li  tn it follows that for all i 2 N;
min

pi;maxfli; tng
	
= min

pi;
t
n
	  t
n
for all i 2 N:
Hence,   t
n
: We consider two cases.
2.1. pi > : Then, tn   = Ui (P ) < pi: By single-peakedness, Ui (P ) i tn :
2.2. pi  : Then, Ui (P ) = pi i tn :
(3) U satises one-sided resource monotonicity. Let P; (Pnt0) 2 P be as in the denition
of the property. Since A (P ) = A (Pnt0) and U satises (iic), cU (P ) = cU (Pnt0). Since
U satises (cons), and using similar arguments to those already used to prove that U is
envy free, we can assume that P 2 P and U = U: We consider two cases.
1.
P
i2N pi  t0  t: Then, for all i 2 N
Ui (P ) = max fpi;minfui; gg and
Ui (Pnt0) = max fpi;minfui; 0gg :
Since t0  t, 0  . Then, for all i 2 N;
pi  Ui (Pnt0)  Ui (P ) :
By single-peakedness, Ui (Pnt0) i Ui (P ) :
2. t  t0 Pi2N pi: The proof is symmetric to the prove of Case 1 and it is omitted.
(10) U does not satisfy strong envy freeness. Let P 2 P be such that N = f1; 2g ; t = 10;
l = (7; 0), u = (9; 9) and for each x 2 [1; 3] and y 2 [7; 9] we have that y 2 x: The set of
feasible allocations is
FA (P ) = f(x1; 10  x1) j x1 2 [7; 9]g [ f(0; 0)g :
Since U is e¢ cient, U (P ) 6= (0; 0) ; which means that U does not satisfy strong envy
freeness.
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(20) U does not satisfy strong individual rationality from equal division. Let P 2 P be such
that N = f1; 2g ; t = 10; l = (1; 2), u = (3; 8) and p2 = 5: The set of feasible allocations is
FA (P ) = f(x1; 10  x1) j x1 2 [2; 3]g [ f(0; 0)g ;
which means that U does not satisfy strong individual rationality from equal division.
(30) U does not satisfy strong one-sided resource monotonicity. Let P 2 P be such that
N = f1; 2; 3g ; t = 10; t0 = 14; l = (1; 1; 12), u = (6; 6; 20), p = (5; 5; 15) ; and for each
i 2 f1; 2g and each x; y 2 [1; 6] ; x i y if and only if jx  5j  jy   5j : Now,
FA (P ) = f(x1; 10  x1; 0) j x1 2 [4; 6]g [ f(0; 0; 0)g and
FA (Pnt0) = f(x1; 0; 14  x1) j x1 2 [1; 2]g [ f(0; x2; 14  x2) j x2 2 [1; 2]g
[ f(1; 1; 12)g [ f(0; 0; 14)g [ f(0; 0; 0)g :
Since U is e¢ cient, for each i 2 f1; 2g, fi (P ) 2 [4; 6] and fi (Pnt0)  2. Thus, U does not
satisfy strong one-sided resource monotonicity. 
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